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Because the literature of European economic history has paid little
attention to traditional electricity systems, the interest in studying Fensa lies
in analysing the different types of companies, which helped to shape the
development of the Spanish electricity sector prior to its present oligopolistic
structure. This case provides insight into two issues. First, we learn about
the behaviour of the second-generation companies (those that based their
production on a controlled hydropower regime), which, despite their limited
size, made their commercial specialisation (supplying the dynamic industrial
market of Guipu´zcoa) their main comparative advantage. Second, we analyse
the behaviour of those companies which at this time, as distribution companies
and/or subsidiaries of the large Spanish companies (Iberduero), were an
instrument of the policy of integrating regional markets.
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RESUMEN
En un contexto historiogra´fico europeo que ha prestado poca atencio´n a
los sistemas ele´ctricos tradicionales (SET), el intere´s de estudiar Fensa reside
en analizar los diferentes tipos de empresas que fueron configurando el desar-
rollo del sector ele´ctrico espan˜ol antes de su actual estructura oligopolı´stica. Este
caso permite conocer, por un lado, el comportamiento de aquellas compan˜ı´as de
segunda generacio´n –las que basaron su explotacio´n en un re´gimen hidra´ulico
regulado– que, a pesar de su limitado taman˜o, hicieron de su especializacio´n
comercial (el abastecimiento del dina´mico mercado industrial de Guipu´zcoa)
su principal ventaja comparativa. Y, por otro, analizar la actuacio´n de aquellas
firmas que se convirtieron, ya como distribuidoras y/o filiales de las grandes
empresas espan˜olas (Iberduero), en un instrumento de la polı´tica de integracio´n
de sus mercados regionales.
Palabras clave: historia empresarial, historia regional y urbana,
empresas ele´ctricas, produccion, precios y estructura de mercado
1. INTRODUCTION
Little is known about the different business types present in the European
electrical sector prior to the Second World War, despite the existence of
excellent works. The history of the electricity industry has been centred on
the foundation, growth and development of the most important companies.
The main explanation is derived from the characteristics of the electricity
industry itself. Since its beginnings, this sector has generally been considered
as the business, which obtains the largest social and economic benefits,
irrespective of the type of property or its territorial extension, when it is
operated under a form of monopolistic industrial organisation based on
vertical integration. In the last quarter of the 20th century, however, nobody
disputed, after the theoretical and empirical evidence gathered mainly in the
1970s in the United States, that the natural monopoly in the electricity sector
was only relevant for transmission. Consequently, generation, distribution
and commercialisation could be carried out in a competitive manner, either
by a vertically integrated model or an unbundled model (Joskow and
Schmanlensee 1983; Newbery 1999).
The existence of a transmission network, public or private, but common
to a large extension of territory, favours the participation of small- and
medium-sized operators, bringing into question one of the fundamental
principles of the sector: the pre-eminence at all times, places and conditions
of economies of scale, as well as the business strategies adopted by its largest
companies (Hirsh 2001).
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This being the case, one of the questions that become relevant from the
point of view of business history concerns the nature of the role of traditional
electricity systems (TES)1 in the provision of an efficient electricity service
before the appearance and consolidation of modern integrated electricity
systems.
Although there are many important studies of large Spanish utilities before
the Civil War, this picture becomes less clear when we start to consider the
behaviour of the small- and medium-sized companies that made up the TES.
Many authors have noted the importance small- and medium-sized companies
had in the early stages of development of the Spanish electricity industry.
There have been different strategies of analysis. Many studies in the field of
business history have aimed at contextualising the beginnings of large
companies, firms that in the medium and long term were more successful
and were therefore the preferred object of study2. From the historical angle,
many studies highlight the evolution of technological, economic and orga-
nisational characteristics prior to the construction of the regional and
1 By TES we understand a wide variety of types of companies that included small power
stations that took advantage of some local feature right up to electricity companies with more
complex connected networks for business but of a limited size and degree of integration between
companies. From the chronological viewpoint, the TES, generally characterized by a predominance
of medium-sized and small companies, were of unquestionable importance in the first 30 years of
the development of the sector. This definition is not intended to be closed, but active and dynamic in
order to better understand what preceded integrated electrical systems (IES). Therefore, it is a
construct capable of improvement and adaptation to other economic and historical contexts.
2 Among others, Antolı´n (1989, 1996, 2006) and Garrue´s (1994) about Hidroele´ctrica Ibe´rica;
Cayo´n (1998, 2002), Aubanell (2000, 2005) and Tedde and Aubanell (2006) about Hidroele´ctrica
Espan˜ola; Dı´az Morla´n (1998, 2006) about Saltos del Duero; Maluquer (1983) and Capel and Urteaga
(1994) about Barcelona Traction; Bernal (1993,1994) about Sevillana, Mengemor and Chorro; and
Germa´n (1990) about ERZ. The only work about the history of the Spanish electricity sector as a
whole before the Civil War in recent decades is the study by Bartolome´ (2007).
TRADITIONAL ELECTRICITY SYSTEMS IN SPAIN
Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History 247
national electricity systems3. These analyses, especially in the last three decades,
have brought our knowledge up to the level of other European countries. There
are, of course, some fields in which the historiography has grown less in relation
to TES. For this reason, from the business history point of view, this article
proposes the application of the case study to the medium-sized and small
utilities. Assessing their production, commercial and financial strategies helps
us, when we have a sufficient critical mass of works, to build a clearer picture of
our diverse and complex industrial past and its impact on the present.
The desirability of exploring the TES does not imply that the starting
point of this article includes an aprioristic idea about the advantage of this
MAP 1
SPANISH HIGH-VOLTAGE TRANSMISSION GRID (1940)
(100 kV)
Manresa
Barcelona
VichSegur
Reus
Adrall
Cledes
Camarasa
Tremp
Capdella
Castellón
Millares
Valencia
Alcoy
Alicante
Perrarua
Zaragoza
Fortunada
Escombreras
Molinar
Murcia
Villora
Pamplona
Sastago
Carcavilla
Villalba
Vera
Almería
Almadenes
Bolarque
Bilbao
Olmedilla
La Carolina
Granada
Puertollano
Burgos
Santander
Málaga
Jauja
Córdoba
Chorro
Peñarroya
Buitreras
Valladolid
Avila
Cádiz
Sevilla
Zamora
Doiras
Guardo
Esla
Oviedo
Huelva
Badajoz
Mérida
La Coruña
Tambre
Vigo
Santiago
Source: Sirvent et al. (1960). Key: (–––) Lines with voltage above 100 kV.
3 See, for example, Amigo (1989, 1992), Germa´n (1990), Maluquer (1992), Aubanell (1992), Nu´n˜ez
(1994, 1995, 1997), Garrue´s (1996, 1997, 2006a and 2006b), Carmona (1999), and Hidalgo (2012).
JOSEAN GARRUE´S-IRURZUN
248 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
TABLE 1
THE SPANISH TES IN COMPARISON WITH THE FIRST RIS IN 1949
Electricity Systems Production
Direct
distribution* Companies RIS leadership**
ES TES TES/ES TES RIS TES RIS Companies
Electricity distributed
in RIS
% Number %
A B C5B:A D E F G H I
1. Iberduero 25 33 29 87 65 193 26 Iberduero 69
2. Hidrola 22 35 34 83 52 87 7 Hidrola 70
3. Galicia 4 6 29 96 81 42 7 Gallega de Electricidad 75
4. Asturias–Cantabria 12 3 6 96 78 39 12 Viesgo; Hidrocanta´brico 62
5. Andalusia 11 12 24 89 93 45 12 Sevillana; Mengemor; Chorro. 94
6. Catalonia 21 3 3 90 72 17 16 Barcelona Traction; Fluido
Ele´ctrico
70
7. Arago´n 5 9 41 91 72 46 6 ERZ 67
Spain 100 100 22 87 70 469 86 33 95
TES: traditional electricity systems; RIS: regional integrated systems; ES: electricity system.
Note: *The rest of the distribution was carried out by other companies; **Companies with more than 20 GWh of the electricity distributed.
Source: Own compilation from Sindicato de Aguas, Gas y Electricidad (1949).
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model of business compared with large firms and/or the first IES. Furthermore,
as this study shows, it is not easy to identify clear lines of division between
the strategies associated with either system. Although the differences of scale,
co-ordination and information of the IES firms always gave them a capacity
to act which was beyond the scope of those linked to the TES, the level of
adaptive efficiency of each company should be studied in its historical and
economic context4.
For this reason, the interest in analysing Fuerzas Ele´ctricas de Navarra
(Fensa)5 lies in enriching the panorama outlined so far of the different types
of companies that participated in the development of the Spanish electricity
industry prior to its current oligopolistic structure and, in particular, the
transition from what are referred to as TES to integrated systems. In this
sense, referring to Navarra, if the studies of Arteta and Irati were repre-
sentative of those pioneering companies that, thanks to their economies of
diversification, were able to survive the growing maturity of the markets
(Garrue´s 2006a and 2006b), this study of Fensa will allow us to examine
two other interesting issues. First, to learn about the behaviour of the
second-generation companies, those that based their business on a con-
trolled hydropower regime, and which had as their main competitive
advantage their commercial specialisation (supplying the dynamic industrial
market of Guipu´zcoa). Second, to analyse the performance of those com-
panies that became, whether as distributors or subsidiaries of the great
companies in the country (Iberduero, from 1946), an instrument of the policy
of integration of regional markets (e.g. Navarra).
All of these matters are developed in different sections. Section 2 deals
with the birth of Fensa, as well as its productive and commercial strategy,
with particular attention to its pricing policy. Section 3 looks at Fensa’s
behaviour in the Guipu´zcoa market and its relations with two of the largest
companies in the country (Saltos del Duero and Hidroele´ctrica Ibe´rica).
In Section 4 the company’s economic-financial development is evaluated.
Section 5 describes its instrumental function, as a subsidiary of Iberduero,
after 1946. Finally, the last part will summarise the main points of the paper.
2. THE BIRTH OF A SECOND-GENERATION COMPANY:
PRODUCTION AND COMMERCIAL STRATEGY
The second phase of industrial electrification, from the technological
viewpoint, came about due to the innovations derived from electricity
transmission over medium and long distances. These allowed the businesses
4 From the point of view of dynamic and evolutionary efficiency, understood as adaptive, see
North (1990).
5 The primary sources are collected at the end of the paper under the title of Sources and a
more detailed account is given in Garrue´s (1996, pp. 667-758 and pp. 1011-1060).
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to benefit from economies of location, scale and scope, which facilitated the
use of the most appropriate local hydro resources, as well as the exploitation
of the large descents existing in mountain ranges and also the small gradients
of large rivers.
Although the advantages of high-voltage power supplies have been known
since 1883, the transmission of large amounts of power over long distances
took several decades to become widespread (Hausman et al. 2008). Its economic
viability only came about once it was technically possible to build large dams to
control the flow. With these dams it became feasible for the first time to take full
advantage of economies of scale in generation, as long as the increase in
minimum flow and its control allowed the extension of constant annual energy
contracts and reduced the overruns caused by the low load of some plants. The
reduction of generation costs associated with the increase in size of production
units, benefited from the widening of the market due to the improvement of
production resources, the quality of service and also, in some cases, the
costs. Additionally, this decrease in costs increased the range of profitability
of electricity transmission and opened up new possibilities for the inter-
connection of systems.
In 1926, the engineer Vı´ctor Urrutia indicated that the most common type
of dam was a diversion dam and channel length, without large reservoirs
(run-of-the-river power plants; Urrutia 1926). This delay between learning
about the transmission of electricity at high voltage and the technology
becoming widespread, given a sufficiently large potential demand, can be
explained in the case of Spain by the concurrence of a number of different
factors6. The waterfalls were a long distance from the points of consumption,
which substantially increased the costs involved in dam projects. Private
business, which in some cases were able to convince Spanish and/or inter-
national sources of finance of the advantages of participating in the larger
scale business (Dı´az Morla´n 1998, 2006; Valdaliso 2006), did not receive
much economic support from the Spanish Administration (Maluquer 2006,
pp. 61-76; Bartolome´ 2011). However, the main restriction was technologi-
cally economic. Large dams underwent a spectacular development once the
new possibilities of the use of reinforced concrete became more widely
known, due to its greater safety, versatility and economy, now supported by
a theoretical basis that complemented the traditional empirical method. This
coincided with the growing process of mechanisation in construction, in part
due to the increased labour costs that occurred during the First World War
and also the important development of the internal combustible engine.
In this technological and economic context, Fensa was established in
February 1927, with a share capital of 3 million pesetas, with the object of
6 Bartolome´ (2005) clearly explained many of these reasons when analysing the failed attempt
to establish a national network and, as a result, the delay in the integration of the Spanish regional
electricity markets.
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producing and distributing electricity from the exploitation of the River
Salado reservoir. This meant the technical, financial and managerial re-
launch of Hidroele´ctrica de Alloz, a failed business venture, which in 1916 had
tried to develop a project designed by the engineer Emilio Azarola.
From a technical point of view, Fensa decided to expand the capacity of
the reservoir of Alloz (to 83.5 hm3) to exploit the high-load peaks during times
of low water level, because there was no waterfall in the province of Guipu´zcoa
that could provide these supplies. The torrential character of the River Salado
and the natural narrowing at the Pen˜as de Tarrabia made this an ideal site for
constructing a hydroelectric dam. The decisions to build a dome dam (one of
the thinnest in Europe for its height) and develop the hydropower resources
were taken by a team of highly qualified engineers7. The construction of
the reservoir of Alloz was the result of a consortium between Confederacio´n
Hidrogra´fica del Ebro and Fensa, from which both benefited. While the former
company solved its serious problem of low water levels in the upper River Ebro
(28,000 ha), the latter succeeded in becoming the best controller of electricity in
the poorly base load-supplied industrial market of Guipu´zcoa8.
As for the financial aspect, Fensa, in contrast to what had happened to its
predecessor, was able to count on the support of a more varied and solid man-
agerial and shareholding group. Its share capital was subscribed by members
of the local upper and middle classes, which, coming from different socio-
professional and political backgrounds, were very active in the setting up of the
most important electricity company in the province. All the same, in its early days
Fensa behaved like a family company. The founding partners were at the same
time its most important promoters, main shareholders and most prominent
managers. With the passing of the years, the economic needs of the company
made it necessary for new capital to be incorporated, including finance capital,
and also for there to be changes in its board of directors, meaning that the
management of the company was ever more distant from the ownership. Even
so, control over the company was retained by the circle of the founders’ family
members, who were also very active in the setting up of other local industries9.
The inauguration of the reservoir of Alloz and its hydropower station
(6,800 kW) took place on July 24, 1930. The rapid expansion of Fensa’s
electricity sales in the Guipu´zcoa market was due to the production availability
of its summer water flow regime and due to the low cost of its constant
supply once the lack of power during winter was complemented by electricity
7 Among them we can highlight the advisor for the dam, Grunner and Orbegozo, one of the
engineers who played an important role in Spanish hydropower development.
8 Errandonea (1931). In accordance with Spanish water policy (Bartolome´ 2011), the state’s
economic contribution to dam construction was not substantial, and in fact was lower than that set
by law. The company received only 15.4 per cent of the total budget (estimated to have been over
7 million pesetas).
9 To see the list of board of directors, shareholders and their participation in other industrial
activities, see Garrue´s (1996).
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bought from other companies in the south of the province (Ele´ctrica Carcar
and Ele´ctrica Recajo). The new demand for a constant supply made it
necessary for Fensa to buy larger amounts of electricity from other compa-
nies each year (Compan˜ı´a Hidra´ulica de Sumbilla in 1932 and Electra Puente
Marı´n and Electra Aranaz in 1940), and even to buy two waterfalls in the
north of Navarra (in 1937). Thus, whilst the energy purchased between 1932
and 1936 was 20 per cent of the distributed production during the Civil War,
the figure increased to 36 per cent, reaching its highest value during the 1943
drought at 70 per cent (Appendix 1). Fensa was transformed from a mere
producer, boosted by strong demand from its new customers, into an inte-
grated producer–distributor purchasing surplus power from other medium-
sized companies through long-term agreements10. In order to rationalise its
activity, Fensa created two subsidiary companies (Saltos de Ituren, 1937 and
Ele´ctrica Aritzacun, 1940) through which it organised high-voltage distribu-
tion in the valley of Oria and low-voltage distribution in San Sebastia´n.
Fensa’s predilection for the Guipu´zcoa market was also conditioned by
the fact that the attempt carried out in 1933 to supply the capital of Navarra,
through the company Electra Pamplona, had to be stopped because of other
companies that operated in the Pamplona cartel (Arteta and Irati)11.
The increasing demand for electricity led the company’s directors to study
the construction of a new hydropower station. Although the company had at
its disposal a large number of the administrative concessions along the River
Salado, the construction of the new waterfall (Man˜eru) brought with it many
problems. In 1936, Fensa, while drawing up a contract for the exchange of
electricity with its main competitor in the Guipu´zcoa market (Ibe´rica), set
out amongst its conditions that there was «no obstacle of any type to the
construction of this when the Fuerzas Ele´ctricas de Navarra deem it to be
convenient»12. The reason behind this condition lay in the restriction on
Ibe´rica, stemming from its agreement with Saltos del Duero (1934)13, in the
event of it trying to increase its production facilities. Although this fact
initially had a major effect on Ibe´rica’s means of production, the spirit of the
10 This is not peculiar to medium-sized enterprises. Ibe´rica, to a lesser extent, suffered a similar
process after signing the agreement with Saltos.
11 The defensive behaviour of Irati and Arteta against Electra Pamplona, buying energy from
Fensa, is understandable considering that the new productive superiority of Pamplona could break
the relatively stable cartel formed by the first three companies after 1916. The price that Irati y Arteta
paid, given the production and financially weakened position of Pamplona in those years, was used
by Ibe´rica, through a supply agreement signed in 1933 with Electra Pamplona, to enter the Pamplona
market (Garrue´s 2006a and 2006b).
12 Records of Fensa’s Board of Directors (from now on RFBD), 29/05/1936, p. 61 and RFBD, 26/
03/1936, p. 60.
13 On the agreement between Saltos del Duero and the Hydro Group, signed 2 years later, in
February 1936, see Dı´az Morla´n (2006, pp. 294-311). This author provides a clear explanation of the
Duero business context and its effects on the development of the Spanish electricity sector. Reading
these pages is extremely helpful to fully understand Section 3 of this article.
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agreement would be broken if the company improved its resources through
agreements with other companies. All of this, obviously, meant that it
depended on the approval of Saltos del Duero.
Another hindrance to the quick construction of the waterfall was the Civil
War. Once the war was over the problems in importing equipment from the
countries now involved in the Second World War, and the problems of post-
war supply shortages affecting Spanish industry became a real headache for
the company’s board of directors. In fact, the Man˜eru hydropower station
came on line at the end of August 1944, 3.5 years later than planned. What is
more, the low quality of the materials used initially reduced its theoretical
capacity of 4,800 kW.
Fensa’s strong commercial specialisation, based on satisfying the energy
demands of industrial businesses, explains the minimal contribution of
domestic consumption, and, in turn, the strong correlation that existed
between industrial consumption and total consumption (Figure 1). The
greater relative importance of domestic consumption in the early years was
due to the fact that the company had not managed to set up the technical
infrastructure necessary to be able to sell all of its production in the Gui-
pu´zcoa market. In addition, in the first year of the Civil War, according to its
board of directors, «the industrial area of Guipu´zcoa was under the tyranny
of the Reds», and its supplies were switched off14. This meant that during this
FIGURE 1
EVOLUTION OF ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTED AND CONSUMED IN FENSA’S
MARKET (1930-1946)
Source: Appendix 1.
14 Records of Fensa’s General Shareholders’ Meeting (from now on RFGM), 31/03/1937, pp. 31-32.
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time a large part of the electricity was directed, through small distributors, to
the domestic market in Navarra. Even so, the growth in industrial consumption
in the first period (1930-1935) was spectacular. Whilst in 1930 the figure was
2.4 GWh, by 1935 this had gone up to 12.5 GWh, with only fifty clients. The
company’s sudden takeoff came about because of the high demand for elec-
tricity among its clients in Guipu´zcoa. In fact, the rapid sale of its energy led it
to buy electricity from third parties in 1932. The first clients before the Civil War
were large- and medium-sized energy consumers, cement factories, paper firms
and electricity companies.
The diversion of part of the production to the Navarra market and the
supply of electricity to the war industry in Guipu´zcoa, and to a lesser extent
Vizcaya, once these provinces had come under nationalist rebel control,
explains why the decrease in consumption during the period of the war was
not greater. Between 1937 and 1943 consumption went up to 4.8 GWh,
mainly due to greater demand from its subsidiary Electra Aritzacun.
The low level of growth of consumption in relation to demand during this
second phase was also connected to Fensa’s limited production capacity.
However, its efforts to expand its supply through new interconnections and
the setting up of subsidiaries did not prevent the first setback, the drought of
1942, from forcing the company to buy energy mainly from Electra Puente
Marin, Saltos de Ituren and Electra Carcar. The situation became even worse
the following year, when its own production was limited to 68 per cent of the
average annual production. Actually, the crisis merely came early in a year
when the restrictions affected the whole of the Spanish electricity sector
(Sudria` 1987; Dı´az Morla´n and San Roma´n 2009).
In Fensa’s final years as an independent company (1943-1946), con-
sumption grew by 37.8 GWh, in large part due to the fact that the Man˜eru
waterfall began production in 1944, and to a lesser extent, because of the
help received from its now parent undertaking, Iberduero (the successor to
Ibe´rica). Along with the new customers, the clients who benefited most from
the Navarra company’s electricity were Cementos Rezola, Juan Echezarreta,
Papelera de Aralar and Algodonera San Antonio.
Once the main lines of supply had been established, Fensa completed its
portfolio with medium-sized and small clients. However, the distribution of
industrial consumption in the 1930s was highly concentrated. The cement
sector (31 per cent), the paper sector (27 per cent) and the electricity sector
(24 per cent) were those that benefited most from Fensa’s electricity15. In the
early-1940s certain activities started to lose importance due to the estab-
lishment of new industries, Fensa’s production limitations and greater
competition from the electricity companies of Guipu´zcoa. In short, from the
15 Obviously, the evolution was not linear. In 1932 the electricity consumption of the utilities
was 8.6 per cent of the total consumption, 3 years later this represented 27.2 per cent and in 1944 it
had increased to 32.6 per cent.
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point of view of inputs, Fensa went from being a producer to a producer–
distributor. As with Ibe´rica or Hidrola its function was producing and trans-
porting electricity to large- and medium-sized customers through long-run
contracts, because the distribution task was delegated to its two subsidiaries16.
The rapid growth of Fensa in the Guipu´zcoa market was not so much due
to a situation of expansion in the industry17, but rather due to the structural
deficiencies of the electricity system in facing the processes of urbanisation
and industrialisation (Garrue´s 1994, pp. 198-209). The electricity market of
Guipu´zcoa, the highest per capita electricity consumption in Spain at that time,
was supplied by a traditional electrical system that was highly decentralised and
poorly integrated in comparison with the highly concentrated Vizcaya model
based around Ibe´rica. In fact, knowing the weakness of market penetration of
Ibe´rica18, which supplied a third of the electricity consumed in Guipu´zcoa
through a small number of large customers and several subsidiaries, the rest of
the consumption was based on the production of many small local utilities and
various types of auto-producers, as well as the energy acquired in the northern
province of Navarra (Garrue´s 1997, chapter 3). In a context where the potential
demand exceeded the production capacity, the Alloz reservoir had important
strategic value. This allowed the company to maintain a constant supply of
energy throughout the year, but especially during summer and autumn19.
What was the role played by industrial prices in the commercial policy of
the company?
The evolution of Fensa’s average prices did not vary greatly, always being
between 8.6 and 9.4 cents of a peseta per kWh, except between 1941-1942.
The evolution of its industrial prices (,2 or 3 cents less than its domestic
prices), given the importance of industrial consumption within its total
consumption, was in line with that described (Table 2).
Fensa offered widely differing rates to its clients. The company offered
better rates to the major consumers than to the small- and medium-sized
consumers, whose prices in the worst cases were above 20 cents/kWh (Table 3).
With the passing of time there were also modifications to prices within the same
type. If we exclude the customer type with the highest consumption (which had
16 In relation to Ibe´rica’s concentration of consumption and the type of clients, see Antolı´n
(1996, pp. 241-244). Regarding Hidrola, see Aubanell (2000, pp. 162-163) and Tedde and Aubanell
(2006, pp. 197-200).
17 In the latter sense, the industry of Guipu´zcoa did not enjoy one of its better periods. In fact,
the most important sectors of Guipu´zcoa industry, those of paper and metal, noted a marked
decrease in the rate of growth since the mid-1920s.
18 The Technical Record of the Five Year Period (1940), elaborated by Ibe´rica, is very clear. The
average consumption between 1935 and 1939 shows that Ibe´rica’s participation in the Basque
Country was the following: Vizcaya (75.4 per cent), Guipu´zcoa (21.5 per cent), Alava (2 per cent) and
Navarra (1 per cent). Ibe´rica at that time controlled only 38 per cent of consumption in Guipu´zcoa
(Garrue´s 1994).
19 Periods when the electricity companies and auto-producers had most problems with their
production due to the low water levels in the local rivers.
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a reduction in price), and that with the lowest consumption (which had an
increase of 7 per cent), the other types saw their prices rise between 1933 and
1943 by more than 23 per cent.
If we take the analysis to a more detailed level, which relates the price and
consumption for each client, we can highlight two facts (Figure 2). First of
all, during the early years there was no strong relationship between the two
variables, some companies received lower prices than others with a higher
level of consumption. Therefore, along with the relationship of the lower
TABLE 2
THE EVOLUTION OF FENSA’S AVERAGE SALE PRICES (1930-1946)
(Cents/KWh)
Year Industrial Domestic Average Year Industrial Domestic Average
1930 8.8 8.8 1939 9.1 11.3 9.2
1931 8.2 12.3 8.6 1940 8.5 11.9 8.8
1932 8.4 11.9 9.3 1941 10.3
1933 8.8 11.3 9.2 1942 10.2
1934 9.1 11.1 9.2 1943 8.6 11.6 8.8
1935 8.6 11.9 8.6 1944 8.9 11.5 9.0
1936 8.9 12.2 9.4 1945 8.0 12.2 8.2
1937 8.6 11.6 9.0 1946 7.7 13.1 8.0
1938 8.7 11.4 8.8
Source: Own compilation from consulting monthly entries in the General Ledger of Fensa (1927-1946)
and the Annual Reports of Fensa (1930-1946).
TABLE 3
THE DISTRIBUTION OF FENSA’S AVERAGE INDUSTRIAL PRICES ACCORDING
TO DIFFERENT TYPES OF CONSUMPTION (1933-1943)
(Cents/KWh)
A B C D E F Average
1933 8.5 8.6 10.4 11.4 21.9 8.8
1936 3.0 8.2 9.1 12.5 14.7 23.3 8.9
1939 6.2 10.4 12.3 11.7 18.4 26.9 9.1
1943 7.0 11.3 13.5 15.7 23.7 8.6
Source: as Table 2.
Key: A: .1,000,001 kWh; B: 500,001-1,000,000; C: 100,001-500,000; D: 50,001-100,000; E: 10,001-
50,000; and F: 1-10,000.
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FIGURE 2
PRICES PAID BY FENSA’S INDUSTRIAL CLIENTS (1933 AND 1943)
(Cents and GWh)
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rates to the greater consumers, other parameters need to be included. This is
not strange if one remembers that Fensa wished to gain entry into markets
that were competitive. The exclusivity of supply, the distance of the point of
consumption from the site of production, the negotiating abilities of the
agents and the prices offered by potential competitors, all had a lot to do with
rates. The second aspect is that, once the distortions in average prices caused
by the Civil War had been eliminated and Fensa’s market had been defined, it
was from 1943 onwards that it can be proven that rates were set mainly
according to consumption levels rather than any other consideration. In fact,
the companies that obtained the best prices (below 10 cents/kWh) were the
cement factories, the electricity distributors and the paper companies, followed
by a fairly small group of medium-sized clients (between 300 and 500 MWh),
who paid between 10 and 12 cents/kW consumed. The vast majority of
companies with low levels of consumption paid prices above 12 cents.
Another criterion that influenced price decisions was the seasonal nature
of consumption. Fensa undercut the main market rates in periods of scarcity
in summer and hours of high consumption and, to a lesser extent, for supplies
dispatched in winter and off-peak hours20.
In short, Fensa’s pricing policy varied essentially in relation to certain aspects:
(a) the total power contracted; (b) consumption; (c) the time of year, summer or
winter; (d) the prices offered by other competing companies; (e) the unit profit
necessary to cover costs, remunerate capital and carry out an adequate policy of
repayments and investments. At the moment the absence of accurate informa-
tion does not reveal the exact importance of these variables in the negotiations to
set Fensa’s selling prices and their renewal. However, in general, the electricity
demand-charge rate structure (a and b variables cited) became, as happened in
the United States with the industrial and large commercial customers, the
principal criteria used to establish rates and introduce the principles of price
discrimination. This policy was the second-best form of peak-load pricing and,
certainly, was not carried out with the rates used for light and household uses
(Neufeld 1987)21. In this type of consumption, where Fensa remained increas-
ingly in competition with Ibe´rica and other companies, the main price discrimi-
nation criteria was to set rates below those offered by competitors (d)22.
There are two differences between Fensa’s average prices in comparison
with those of Irati and Arteta, two important Navarra companies (Table 4).
The first is the relative stability of Fensa’s prices throughout the period.
20 For example, Portland and Rezola had to pay for winter power at 3 or 4 cents/kWh, respec-
tively, and summer power at 9 cents/kWh.
21 A clear and comprehensive explanation of the «electricity demand-charge rate structure» and
its implementation in Spain can be seen in Antolı´n (1988).
22 In the industrial market, except for several large consumers, Ibe´rica’s interest in competing
with Fensa must have been very weak. Among other reasons, because Ibe´rica would incur a high
opportunity cost establishing the necessary infrastructure to distribute electricity to places that were
relatively remote, disperse and with a complicated orography.
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This was because its structure of consumption was perfectly defined, basi-
cally industrial consumption, while in the other two companies it was more
complex and dynamic; lighting and industry in Pamplona, plus its own
consumption in the case of Irati. The second difference is seen in the fact that
Fensa’s prices were lower due to the nature of its production, capacity to
store energy and the competitiveness of its market.
The competitiveness of the Navarra company is obvious if its prices
are compared with those of the other companies from Guipu´zcoa and
Vizcaya (Table 5). After 1934, Fensa’s average prices were lower than those
TABLE 4
IBE´RICA, IRATI AND FENSA PRICES ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT TYPES OF
CONSUMPTION
(Cents/kWh and % of consumption)
Ibe´rica Irati Fensa
1935 1937 1935
Cents/
kWh %
Cents/
kWh %
Cents/
kWh %
Low-voltage 30.1 13.3 26.2 28.3 11.9 0.7
Lighting and domestic uses 42.5 6.7 34.8 12.6
Public 23.7 1.4
Residential 59.8 2.9
Fixed-base rates 33.6 1.8
Domestic uses 30.0 0.5
Industrial 17.6 6.6 15.0 15.7 11.9 0.7
High-voltage 7.5 86.7 3.4 71.7 8.6 99.3
Distribution companies 9.4 8.8 9.1 9.4
Traction 7.9 18.9 11.2* 8.2
Electrochemical and electro-
metallurgy
6.9 4.7 1.5* 55.4
Industrial 7.1 54.3 8.3 89.9
Cement and paper industries 8.2 8.5 8.1 7.3 20.1
Altos Hornos de Vizcaya 5.2
Total 10.5 100.0 9.2 100.0 8.6 100.0
Note: *Own consumption.
Source: as Table 2.
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TABLE 5
AVERAGE PRICE OF ELECTRICITY FOR FENSA’S MOST IMPORTANT CLIENTS, AND FOR OTHER COMPANIES OPERATING IN
THE VASCO-NAVARRO MARKET (1930-1946)
(cents/kWh)
Prices offered by Fensa to:
Cement
companies Paper manufacturers Distributors Average prices of other companies
Year CPa CRb JEc PAd JCe RACf EGCg PPh Ebchi ECj CESSk ERl Ebim Ebern Arito Fensap Arteta Irati Ibe´rica Duero Guipq Irurak Bilbao
1930 7,4 12.5 8.5 6.9
1931 8.8 8.1 5.9 13.0 7.3 11.3 9.2 6.9
1932 7.8 8.2 8.2 13.0 10.4 4.0 12.0 10.0 10.0 12.8 7.9 9.9 7.8 6.7
1933 7.8 2.5 8.2 8.3 8.2 13.3 9.6 6.1 12.0 10.0 12.6 12.3 7.8 11.4 9.3 6.7
1934 7.7 2.8 8.2 8.3 8.2 10.3 10.2 6.4 11.9 10.4 10.1 12.8 7.8 12.7 9.3 9.3
1935 8.6 3.0 8.2 8.2 8.2 11.0 8.5 7.3 10.4 11.8 12.6 7.3 12.3 8.4 8.8 5.0 9.1 19.1 29.5
1936 8.0 3.0 8.2 6.9 8.2 8.4 10.7 9.9 6.8 9.7 10.4 13.0 13.0 8.0 11.5 6.3 9.1 7.9 9.5 21.8 28.8
1937 6.2 4.0 8.2 6.7 8.2 12.6 12.4 12.0 8.5 8.9 11.3 10.4 16.1 12.6 7.6 11.4 6.3 10.8 2.8 9.6 21.8 27.5
1938 9.0 5.1 8.2 6.8 11.9 12.4 12.3 12.0 10.0 8.0 7.9 10.4 10.7 11.5 7.5 11.5 6.8 9.7 5.0 9.8 19.8 27.6
1939 5.5 8.2 6.7 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.0 8.5 7.6 6.2 10.4 12.2 10.8 8.0 7.8 11.3 7.9 8.7 5.0 9.8 20.2 29.6
1940 5.3 8.2 7.0 12.3 12.4 12.4 7.4 8.9 8.3 8.0 27.8
1941 10.2 9.9 10.7 10.0 9.1 8.7 9.3 8.6 6.9 26.0
1942 10.2 9.9 10.7 10.0 9.1 8.7 10.0 9.6 7.4 23.2
TABLE 5 (Cont.)
Prices offered by Fensa to:
Cement
companies Paper manufacturers Distributors Average prices of other companies
Year CPa CRb JEc PAd JCe RACf EGCg PPh Ebchi ECj CESSk ERl Ebim Ebern Arito Fensap Arteta Irati Ibe´rica Duero Guipq Irurak Bilbao
1943 5.0 8.2 6.7 11.1 12.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 11.0 8.0 7.8 11.0 9.1 8.0 24.6
1944 5.0 8.0 7.0 11.0 7.6 11.3 11.5 6.9
1945 8.0 10.0 11.0 8.0 7.0 11.9 11.0 7.4
1946 5.0 8.0 7.0 11.0 9.6 6.7 9.5 11.3 11.7 11.9 8.0 6.8 11.8 12.3 6.1
Source: For Fensa prices, see Table 2; for the other companies see Sources in the bibliography and the Annual Reports of each company cited.
Key: aCementos Portland; bCementos Rezola; cJose Echezarreta; dPapelera Aralar; eJose´ y Cia; fRuiz, Azcarate y Cı´a; gEchezarreta, G. Mendı´a y Cı´a; hPapelera de Portu; iElectra Berchin; jElectra
Carcar; kCı´a Ele´ctrica de San Sebastia´n; lElectra Recajo; mElectra Bidasoa; nElectra Berrueza; oElectra Aritzacun; pIn this table, average prices take into account the electricity distributed;
qDistribuidora Ele´ctrica Guipu´zcoana. In the rest of the tables of Fensa prices, however, the electricity taken into account is that which was consumed.
of Ibe´rica and those of its most important subsidiaries23. In this advanta-
geous situation for distribution, Fensa was able to cover its limited produc-
tion capacity by seeking alliances with other producers (such as Saltos del
Duero) and endangering the future influence of Ibe´rica in this unorganised
market. On the other hand, the fact that the average prices of the Ibe´rica
distributors in Guipu´zcoa compared favourably with those of its distributors
in Vizcaya was due to the monopoly exercised by Ibe´rica in the Vizcaya
market, the type of clients reserved for the distributor in this market, generally
low-voltage customers, and the lower level of energy produced by the company
itself. The fact that Fensa’s prices, except during the Civil War, appeared not to
be very different from even those of a young, important production company
like Saltos del Duero shows, once more, its competitiveness through prices
and corroborates that the takeover of Fensa was closely related, in the first
place, to its limited production resources and, as a consequence of this, its
limited capacity to respond to the post-war restructuring of the Spanish
electricity market.
While being aware of the fact that the average selling price of electricity
can provide some indirect knowledge of its evolution, the most appropriate
analysis to determine pricing policy in comparative terms requires a dis-
aggregated study as made possible either by categories of consumption
(lighting, power, traction) or types (high- and low-voltage supplies)24. Fensa
offered more competitive prices than Ibe´rica especially in high-voltage supplies
to paper and cement companies (the most important segment of its consump-
tion) and to a lesser extent to distribution companies. The price advantage over
low-voltage industrial supplies was not very relevant in terms of consumption
for Fensa (Table 4).
3. FENSA’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE FORMATION OF THE
VASCO-NAVARRO ELECTRICITY MARKET
The formation of Fensa’s market is of interest in two senses. First, the fact
that it was established relatively late at a time when the development of the
Spanish electricity sector was quite advanced. Second, due to the strategic
value it acquired for two large Spanish companies (Hidroele´ctrica Ibe´rica and
Saltos del Duero25) in the control of the Vasco-Navarra market.
23 Before this date, the prices offered by Fensa were higher than those of Ibe´rica for one main
reason: its expansion in Guipu´zcoa, intended to supplement the energy supply of a small group of
industrial customers, was not allowed to conflict with the plans drawn up by Ibe´rica in this province.
This situation of mutual respect had to change precisely when Fensa reached an agreement with
Compan˜ı´a Ele´ctrica de San Sebastia´n (1933) and Electra Berchı´n (owner of the Compan˜ı´a de Tranvias
de San Sebastia´n), two companies that provided light and low-voltage power to the heart of the
province, its capital.
24 Another alternative would be to compare the individual company rates.
25 To properly understand the business context it is helpful to read Dı´az Morla´n (2006).
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3.1. The first steps
Although the demand for electricity in Guipu´zcoa during this period
increased, we can assume that the existing companies were not very happy
about the entry of a new operator into the market. The possibility that
Ibe´rica, the main producer in the region, would stop the Fensa project was
unlikely. Among other reasons, this was due to the exploitation of the Alloz
reservoir, which was included in the new water policy of the State, with the
support of the Hydrographic Confederations whose intentions were to re-launch
the country’s economic growth by fostering the development of multi-use dams
related to agricultural irrigation and industrial electrification activities (see also
footnote 21). The consumers must have had a different opinion. In principle,
they would benefit from the price war that this new situation would generate, as
well as from the extended and more specific supply.
The policy of Fensa up to the start of the Civil War was to give preference to
the Guipu´zcoa market, focussing on the capture of three areas of this market:
(a) industries of a considerable size; (b) electricity companies; and (c) certain
town councils. The Navarra company had a strategy that was similar to that
displayed by the country’s large electricity companies: to place its high-voltage
production rapidly by way of contracts with large clients, thereby externalising
the costs of distribution at low tension to the medium-sized local companies26.
3.2. Relationships with the Guipu´zcoan distributors and the first
contacts with Ibe´rica
Fensa multiplied its contacts with different Guipu´zcoan electricity com-
panies and, in June 1931, it began talks with Ibe´rica to try to avoid any
competition that would be damaging to either party. It should be remem-
bered that one of the preferred objectives of Ibe´rica, after the appearance of
the largest electricity-generating company in the country (Saltos del Duero
and the signing of the Pacto de Auxilio Mutuo with the Grupo Hidroele´ctrico-
Hydro Group in 193027), was to reinforce its production and financial position
in the Guipu´zcoa market. The approach by Fensa was brought to a successful
conclusion by way of sporadic interchanges of electricity with Ibe´rica’s most
26 In the provincial market, Fensa signed its first contract for the sale of electricity with
Cementos Portland in 1930, and it began negotiations with a number of local Navarra councils. This
electricity was mainly used for public and domestic lighting and, to a lesser extent, for the supply of
rural industries. The initial idea of setting up their own subsidiary distributor in Navarra for this
purpose, as defended by the prestigious Spanish publicist and Fensa engineer Errandonea, was not
put into practice. The company preferred to sell its electricity through small local distributors. This
probably happened because the rationalization of distribution proposed by Errandonea, whilst
profitable in the long term, required major investment in the short term and did not offer sufficient
guarantees of profits in the medium term, given the geographical spread and level of consumption in
this rural market.
27 Annual Reports of Hidroele´ctrica Ibe´rica, 1930, pp. 7-8.
JOSEAN GARRUE´S-IRURZUN
264 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
important subsidiary in Guipu´zcoa, the Distribuidora Ele´ctrica Guipu´zcoana,
and with one of the oldest companies in the capital, the Compan˜ı´a Ele´ctrica
de San Sebastia´n. Later, in 1933, the desire to consolidate relations with
Ibe´rica through a project of minimum rules of exchange failed when the latter
did not accept the conditions imposed by Fensa. Two years later, encouraged by
substantial changes in the Vasco-Navarro market due to the agreement signed
by Duero and Hydro Group (1934), the latter two companies signed a contract
(21/10/1935) pending the approval of Duero. Meanwhile, partial agreements
were formalized for the adjudication of new supplies, but this was not without
tension between the respective distributors when defining prices and markets.
After 6 months of deferments, Fensa denounced the contract with Ibe´rica28,
given that Duero did not ratify it. The Navarra company left and did not comply
with its obligatory annual minimum consumption (2 GWh) or the parts of the
agreement regarding rates, zones and link-ups. However, 2 months later, talks
resumed, perhaps with the intention of qualifying certain matters established
in the 1934 Agreement between Duero and Ibe´rica, which could have been an
obstacle to the agreed contractual terms. Fensa expressed the following desires
to Ibe´rica: (a) complete liberty to build its second hydropower station; (b) that
the prices offered by Ibe´rica’s distributing companies should be the same or
higher than those offered by Fensa; (c) freedom of consumption during peak
hours and a minimum price for the obligatory quota.
3.3. The interconnection with the Basque network: Fensa, from
independent company to distributor for Iberduero
Why didn’t Duero endorse the agreement between Ibe´rica and Fensa? The
reply to this question is of great interest in understanding part of the new
structure of the market in the north of the Peninsula. The appearance of
Duero (the largest Spanish producer with no specific market of its own) on
the scene not only affected the large north-west and south-east Spanish
utilities, who were obliged to defend the status quo with the 1934 Agreement,
but also much smaller ones, like Fensa, which had found a niche in the gaps
of the TES. Consequently, Ibe´rica put pressure on its distributors to increase
their consumption and strengthened its relationship with Compan˜ı´a Ele´ctrica
del Urumea and Ele´ctrica de San Sebastia´n. However, in addition to these
common effects suffered by medium-sized and small companies29, the case
of Fensa presented an additional peculiarity. This singularity was the result
of the strategic position Fensa occupied for certain companies (Duero and
Ibe´rica) as an instrument of penetration or as an obstacle to conquering the
dynamic market of Guipu´zcoa.
28 Records of Hidroele´ctrica Ibe´rica’s Board of Directors (from now on RHIBD), 15/04/1936.
29 Disputes over other adjoining markets (Electra Recajo, Hidroele´ctrica Moncayo, EIA and ERZ)
were also common in these years. RHIBD, 31/01/1936, 15/04/1936, 12/07/1937, and 02/12/1940.
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Duero, despite having reached an agreement with Ibe´rica over the sharing
out of a large part of the market in the north of Spain30, knew that the
production situation of its partner was not ideal for effective control of this
market31. For this reason, although Duero was not in a position to demand this,
neither would it favour the development and consolidation of Ibe´rica in these
markets, because it did not want to strengthen Ibe´rica’s negotiating position.
In this way, Duero’s refusal to approve the agreement between Ibe´rica and Fensa
acquires its real significance. The result was that Duero would halt the expan-
sion of Ibe´rica in important markets, Guipu´zcoa and, to a lesser extent, Navarra,
and would open the possibility of them entering these markets.
Two years after the end of the Civil War, on February 26, 1941, as Ibe´rica
tried to set up a sole distributor to avoid competition in Guipu´zcoa, Fensa
resumed contacts with Ibe´rica and its subsidiaries (Distribuidora Ele´ctrica
Guipu´zcoana and Compan˜ı´a Ele´ctrica del Urumea). However, as Fensa would
not yield to the desires of Ibe´rica, in relation to the exchange of shares,
and the price and quantity of the supply, the attempt failed. In 1943 the two
companies got together again, at the request of Ibe´rica, to bring order into the
Guipu´zcoa market. This is hardly surprising considering that, according to
Ibe´rica’s board of directors: «the competition between the companies was great,
and the abuse of the customers reached unsuspected heights»32; apart from the
economic burden that the electrical restrictions were causing to their balance
sheets. But given that almost all of the solutions depended on the blessing of
Duero, Fensa had no alternative but to sign a contract with that company to
«share and supply» (16/2/1944)33. The model of this contract was consistent
with the commercial policy designed by Duero in 1932. This consisted of placing
enormous quantities of energy in its «own markets» for distribution, as
occurred in Castilla (Amigo 1992), through distributors in which it had a
shareholding, as opposed to the idea of setting up a subsidiary for this purpose.
In addition, Duero became the largest shareholder in Fensa, holding one-sixth of
the paid-up capital, and Fensa became just one more distribution subsidiary.
Having reached this point, it is necessary to ask two questions. The first
concerns the reasons that would explain the interference by Duero in the
areas shared with Ibe´rica. The second question concerns the reasons why Fensa
30 Under this agreement, the latter company would control the distribution exclusively in the
provinces of Vizcaya, Alava, Guipu´zcoa, Navarra, Logron˜o and the north of the province of Burgos.
The Spanish market was divided into exclusive markets for Duero, Ibe´rica and Espan˜ola and mar-
kets shared with Duero (by Viesgo, Ibe´rica, Espan˜ola, Alberche and Castilla). In the latter, Ibe´rica
acquired a quota from Saltos and when it finished the increases in consumption were split between
Saltos and Ibe´rica.
31 In fact, in August 1939 and 1941, the directors of Ibe´rica gave sweeping powers to its
chairman and his manager to make whatever efforts were necessary to sign agreements with respect
to the Guipu´zcoa and La Rioja markets, respectively. RHIBD, 28/08/1939, 26/01/1940, 16/05/1941,
25/08/1941 and 19/09/1941.
32 Annual Reports of Hidroele´ctrica Ibe´rica, 1942, p. 6.
33 RFGM, 23/03/1944, pp. 76-91.
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became a subsidiary of Duero. As has been indicated on another occasion when
explaining the formation of the Vasco-Navarro market (Garrue´s 1994), the
replies to both questions should be analysed in the light of the effects of the
agreement in 1942 between Saltos and Ibe´rica (Convenio 1942), which, sub-
stituting the document signed in 1934, reflected the new balance of forces
existing between the two companies. Among other reasons, the 1942 Agreement
meant a greater liberalisation of the market, implying the entry or participation
in the market of a new producer (Duero) in those areas of intensive electricity
demand that had previously been under the influence of Ibe´rica, but which it
had not actually controlled. In exchange, Ibe´rica would be able to expand its
production capacity through new facilities in order to deal with increases in
consumption and put an end to the supply restrictions. Duero managed to «sell
directly, using our own means of production, to high-voltage clients of their
markets, a quantity of electricity equivalent to half of the total increase»34. From
this we can understand Ibe´rica’s loss of power in the Guipu´zcoa, Navarra and
Rioja markets, and the reason why Duero acquired distribution subsidiaries in
markets that up to that time had been the domain of Ibe´rica, and, in this
particular case, the strategic importance of Fensa.
The complex relationships were made more transparent after the birth of the
largest Spanish electricity company, Iberduero (30/9/1944), a result of the merger
between Ibe´rica and Duero. From this moment onwards, the sharing out of
the market between different subsidiaries and/or parent companies would not
take any longer than strictly necessary. The directors of Fensa, in almost all the
meetings held in Bilbao with the board of Duero, showed great concern over the
effects on its future of the birth of Iberduero, and in particular, over the validity of
the 1942 Agreement. The board of the new company, however, managed to
transmit the necessary reassurance. The proof of this is seen in the fact that in
November of that year their networks were interconnected in a permanent way.
There were two consequences of the creation of Iberduero that were
particularly important for Fensa, as will be explained later. These were: (a) the
loss of autonomy in management, although for purely financial motives it
survived as a subsidiary until 1991. Also as a result of this first consequence,
(b) its new operative and commercial policies, now exclusively as a distribution
company, directed at the organisation of the electricity markets in the centre
and south of Navarra, ceding its traditional markets in Guipu´zcoa and the
north-west of Navarra to the parent company.
3.4. The agreement with Saltos del Duero (1944) and the first
actions as a subsidiary
The directors of Fensa justified the «Share and Supply» agreement (16/2/
1944) with Duero to their shareholders as the only way to avoid the company’s
34 Annual Reports of Saltos del Duero, 1942.
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supply problems. The agreement was signed with Duero because it was the only
company that would be able to offer the necessary supply guarantees. In effect,
Duero said it would respect the industrial business of the Navarra company and
offered a minimum quota of auxiliary energy (6 GWh) at a reasonable price, as
long as they held «control of Fensa (y) to avoid future competition, always
disastrous to the interests of the companies»35. Although this control did not
imply the dissolution of the company, it came at a great price: Duero became its
major shareholder.
As for the supply contract, Fensa had discretional power over the
distribution of the maximum quota that Duero had the right to com-
mercialise in Guipu´zcoa, Navarra and Logron˜o with the exception of the
major consumers (10 GWh p.a.) who were served directly by Duero. The
duration of the contract was conditioned by the 1942 Agreement between
Duero and Ibe´rica, in other words until January 1, 1958. To Fensa, to
have energy with no obligation in relation to minimum consumption
periods (low water levels or winter), nor time (peak hours), meant it
could count on a supply of permanent electricity in greater quantities
than thermal energy, and at a cheaper price than hydro. In addition, this
contract had the advantage of favouring the sale of Fensa’s own pro-
duction as constant energy, with the consequent improvement in sale
prices, and guaranteed services of supply. The change in the composition
of the shareholders would matter little or not at all to the directors and
shareholders of Fensa. This was because they would be guaranteed the
continued value, as opposed to the risks of a renewed market, where com-
petition through production and prices could lead them to a progressive
decapitalisation36.
With the appearance on the scene of the new company, Iberduero occu-
pied itself with the reorganisation of the Guipu´zcoa market, leaving Fensa
in charge of restructuring its southern market. With this intention, in
September 1946 Fensa acquired Electra Pamplona, an old Ibe´rica subsidiary,
in exchange for its distributive and productive elements (Saltos de Ituren and
Electra Aritzacun) in Guipu´zcoa. With this exchange of assets, Iberduero went
from controlling one-sixth of Fensa’s capital to having more than 50 per cent
of its shares. It was then that Iberduero changed the articles of incorporation
of Fensa, reducing the power of its board of directors and modifying its
traditional way of sharing profits.
35 RFBD, 4/03/1944, p. 104.
36 The agreement between Saltos and Fensa allowed the latter company to maintain its tradi-
tional structure of dividends: 5 per cent to capital reserves; 10 per cent to the board of directors; up
to a maximun 7 per cent of capital invested by shareholders; and the rest as decided by the General
Meeting of Shareholders. It should be noted, however, that the downward trend of Fensa’s dividends
between the end of the Civil War and 1944 (4 per cent in the last year) contrasted with the positive
evolution of other companies like Saltos (6.30 per cent in 1944) or Ibe´rica (6 per cent in the same
year; Appendix 2).
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4. ECONOMIC PROFITABILITY
It can be stated that the return on Fensa’s assets (ROA) improved when
the company became integrated into the Iberduero system (Figure 3)37. The
variations in factors of an industrial nature (initially due to financial costs38
and, later, due to those arising from productive insufficiencies39), compared
with a relatively stable commercial factor (sale prices) and a less than effi-
cient management of assets (among other reasons, due to the delays suffered
FIGURE 3
EVOLUTION OF FENSA’S RETURN ON ASSETS (ROA), RETURN ON EQUITY (ROE)
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Source: see Appendices 1 and 2
37 For a more detailed analysis, see Garrue´s (1996, pp. 740-749).
38 Financial expenses were increased from 1934 to 1940. Up to 1934 the company’s finance
had been based largely on self-financing (based on increasing the capital share in 1928). There-
after, the expenses incurred by the electricity infrastructure, the recovery of Hidroele´ctrica de Alloz
foundation obligations and bond investments in subsidiaries to restructure (Ituren and Aritzacun)
demanded that Fensa also use long-term and short-term external financing (through 5,000
mortgage bonds in 1934 and 2,000 in 1937). This meant a significant increase in annual interest
rate and depreciation. The situation was corrected, however, by taking advantage of the fact that
new funds were needed to build the second waterfall and to alleviate the debts incurred they
resorted to self-financing again (a capital share increase of 6 million pesetas in 1939, 8 million in
1940 and 10 million in 1942).
39 The downturn in the ROS (rate on sales) was due, on the one hand, to a combination of
relatively low electricity prices and rising costs. Within the latter were the especially burdensome
costs of purchasing power from third parties. This issue was closely linked to the evolution of
demand and the gradual strangulation of its own production, rather than the possible variation in
the prices of purchased energy. In no case did it exceed 7 cents/kWh. The purchase of electricity
between 1938 and 1944 was increased by 6 per cent, constituting by the latter date, 60 per cent of the
total expenditure.
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in investments becoming productive40), explain the limited and unequal
development in profitability in the first phase (1930-1944).
In the second half of the 1940s and the early-1950s (1945-1953), by then as a
subsidiary of Iberduero, profitability did not improve substantially because the
restructuring of the Navarra market (the takeovers of EP, HM, HCV, Evz, ET
and EE) had a high cost for the company41. The greater development of ROA in
the third stage (1954-1959) was due, in part, to the fact that Fensa managed to
improve its profits per unit (TTUs and financial reorganisation42), and also
because it achieved a more adequate management of its assets. This positive
evolution should have been maintained in the last period (1960-1980), but the
takeover of Irati-Arteta43 (1961) and, above all, the new policy of Iberduero in
relation to the self-financing of Fensa, which reduced declared profits to a
minimum, did not help to specify the development of this variable adequately44.
The development of Fensa was financed with its own capital, which gave
it acceptable levels of solvency and indebtedness (Figure 3). Fensa’s financing
was not as advantageous as that of certain large companies like Ibe´rica or
Hidrola, which, having the financial support of large banks from the beginning,
could make financing more intense, agile and less costly in terms of the use
of credit, and even in the handling of bonds45. Unlike large companies, the
difficulties in obtaining finance capital made Fensa prefer very conservative
financial policies based on equity capital (capital increases). Meanwhile, Ibe´rica
made a relatively greater use of credit, while Hidrola opted for the use of
bonds46. The consequence of Fensa’s conservative policy was a reduced capacity
for risk-taking and new investment and, ultimately, a greater dependence on
and vulnerability to the growing competitiveness of the large companies.
40 The results of 1943, for example, demoralized the Fensa board of directors, especially when
they saw that more than 50 per cent of capital invested in the construction of the second power
station had not begun to offer results.
41 This explains the difference between the ROA and return on equity (ROE). Between 1947 and
1952, the long-term liabilities increased from 1.7 to 52.7 million pesetas while the capital share of
the company was only 30 million.
42 Among others, it was important to increase the capital share in 1953.
43 The takeover of Irati-Arteta required a capital share of 100 million pesetas. This increased
from 60 to 160 million pesetas.
44 This company, once it had completed its main task, the concentration of Navarra market
and, above all, when Iberduero became its sole shareholder (1966), suffered a significant mutation.
That is why Iberduero showed no interest in distributing profits according to the real business,
especially when they had to pay significant taxes. Iberduero, taking advantage of regional and state
legislation, consequently reduced its profits by increasing depreciation and reserves.
45 Regarding the relationship between Ibe´rica and Banco Vizcaya, see Antolı´n (1996), pp. 251-252
and on the interconnection between Hidrola and diverse financial groups (Banco de Vizcaya, Banco
Central y Banco Hispano Americano) and its impact in the business and financial strategy, see Aubanell
(2000, pp. 155-162) and Tedde and Aubanell (2006, pp. 170-177).
46 However, the relationship between equity capital and obligations in Ibe´rica and Espan˜ola
was very similar (1921-1929, 0.9 and 1930-1936, 1.7; 1938-1944, 3.0) (Antolı´n 2006; Tedde
and Aubanell 2006). As expected this ratio was in favour of the equity capital (1916-30, 2.1 and
1937-1944, 5.3) in Fensa’s case (Garrue´s 1996).
JOSEAN GARRUE´S-IRURZUN
270 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
Beyond this consideration, the analysis of the financial evolution needs
certain clarifications.
As an independent company, growing financial demands forced it to resort
to external capital. Although this did not endanger the company’s solvency, it
led it to worrying levels of indebtedness, especially between 1934 and 1938. This
situation was corrected through three capital increases (1939, 1940 and 1942),
which allowed it to reduce the imbalance in its financial structure and indebt-
edness, and also allowed it to commit to important investments in such a way
that, although profitability in the first half of the 1940s was very weak, the same
thing did not happen with its financial situation. Consequently, if the conversion
of Fensa into a subsidiary of Saltos del Duero was unavoidable, above all taking
into account the medium-term economic situation, this was not the case from a
financial point of view. This being so, the interest of Saltos del Duero in
acquiring the services of this company, apart from those mentioned in the
reform of the Guipu´zcoa-Navarra market, would only increase.
In the first years (1948-1958) as a subsidiary of Iberduero, Fensa’s financial
structure, solvency and indebtedness showed negative trends. This situation
can be understood if one takes into account the cost that it had to pay, as a
subsidiary, for the restructuring of its new market. From that time onwards,
the financial situation of the company progressed without any major problems,
as far as Iberduero allowed it a sufficient margin of operation to achieve a
sufficient level of self-finance.
The comparison of the economic-financial situations of Fensa and Ibe´rica
shows that, although from 1938 the profitability of the Navarra company
was not very different from that of the company from Vizcaya and their
commercial and industrial margins were comparable, their capacity for
manoeuvre was radically different. Ibe´rica was in a phase of rapid expansion
while Fensa was struggling to survive in the market. In addition, the financial
behaviour of Ibe´rica indicates a stability that is not comparable in any way to
that of Fensa because the slightest setback destabilised its accounts. It is
hardly necessary to observe that, in contrast, the shareholding in Ibe´rica
maintained by some of the most important financial institutions in the
country gave the company a guarantee that the medium-sized electricity
companies could not compete with. However, the evolution of costs speaks
volumes. The crisis in the TES occurred when the unit costs of the small or
medium companies (e.g. Arteta, Fensa and Irati) were higher than those of
the larger companies (e.g. Ibe´rica; Figure 4).
5. EPILOGUE: INTEGRATION OF THE NAVARRA MARKET INTO
IBERDUERO’S SYSTEM
The transformation of Fensa into a subsidiary of Iberduero meant a
radical change in its development. On the supply side, within a few years it
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became the most important distributor in Navarra. In 1954, the electricity
bought from Iberduero amounted to more than half of the energy distributed
by Fensa, by 1980 it amounted to almost 100 per cent (Figure 5). The
acquisitions of energy before the 1970s were marked by a strong increase
in demand on the TES, which could not be satisfied by the as yet unconso-
lidated integrated systems. From that time onwards, the growth in energy
bought by Fensa evolved at a rate imposed by the needs of the consumer
market. The development in its own production, after its Man˜eru hydropower
station came on line (1944), was due to the incorporation of production and
distribution assets that Fensa was absorbing47 and to the greater rationalisation
of generation, the automation of hydropower stations, of transport and of the
commercialisation of the electricity supplied to the network.
As part of this idea of optimisation, Fensa improved the lines of trans-
mission that supplied the important nuclei of consumption, adjusting them
to the same voltage as Iberduero’s system. It managed to eliminate two of the
FIGURE 4
EVOLUTION OF REAL UNIT COSTS OF FENSA, IBE´RICA, IRATI AND ARTETA
(1900-1965). POLINOMIC TENDENCY (Cents-1913-/kWh)
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47 Among others: Electra de Pamplona, 1946; Hidra´ulica Moncayo, 1948; Hidroele´ctrica Cinco
Villas, Electra Vozmediano and Electra Turiano, 1949; Central de An˜o´n, 1950; Electra Estellesa, 1951;
Alfaro Hnos. y Vda. de Gambarte and Sdad. de Maderas, 1962; Hidra´ulica Urederra, 1965, etc.
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evils that had long affected almost all of the TES, that is to say losses in
distribution and consumer fraud.
The process of modernisation also affected Fensa’s own means of
production. From the mid-1960s, hydropower stations were automated,
new groups and sub-stations were installed and the capacity of others
was increased. In the 1980s, Fensa undertook the recovery of the micro-
power stations paving the way for the agreement signed between the
Administration and Unesa in 1981. In Navarra the task of recovering the
micro-power stations fell to a new company, Energı´a Hidroele´ctrica de
Navarra (EHN).
The evolution of energy consumption in Fensa’s market closely followed
the same tendency noted in the evolution of energy distributed. With
the passage of time, and the extent to which transmission and distribution
losses were notably reduced, they converged48. The level of consumption
grew continually from the 1950s to the time of the first oil crisis (14 per cent),
when it suffered a strong setback, above all in industrial consumption
(Appendix 1).
FIGURE 5
EVOLUTION OF ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTED AND CONSUMED IN FENSA’S
MARKET (1947-1980)
Source: Appendix 1.
48 The loss went from 30 per cent of energy distributed in the late-1940s, to just 5 per cent in the
early-1980s.
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The rapid increase of the 1950s and 1960s was not produced merely by
the rate of industrialisation and urban development in the province, but also
by the dramatic expansion of Fensa through the absorption of other com-
panies. With respect to the territorial extension, in 1965, for example, the
electricity used by its clients amounted to,72 per cent of the total consumed
in Navarra. As for the intensity of consumption, that the majority of the
electricity was distributed at low voltage confirms the company’s known role
as a distributor. In any case, the evolution of consumption proves the fact
that industrial and urban development in the 1950s and 1960s underwent a
strong boom, echoing its course of the first third of the century. The growing
importance of industrial consumption, compared with domestic and agri-
cultural consumption, gives an idea of the industrial dynamism of those
years. Whilst in 1950 industrial use amounted to 50 per cent of total con-
sumption, 13 years later it came to 71 per cent.
There is no doubt, in this sense, that had Navarra continued to be
restricted exclusively to TES, it would have been left behind in the first great
wave of industrialisation in post-war Spain, and its inhabitants’ standard of
living would have been adversely affected. That this is so does not mean that
the TES did not play a hugely important economic role, although not all
reached the level of efficiency of some regional integrated systems.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In the Spanish electricity sector, as in the majority of other European
electricity sectors until their nationalisation after the Second World War,
large companies co-existed alongside what are called TES. With the spread of
high-voltage transmission, the TES gradually disappeared as the large
companies benefited from huge economies of scale and network, typical of
the first IES. The establishment and market domination of the large com-
panies was a process that in some countries, like Spain, was relatively slow.
Thus, the benefits of this new industrial organisation came once the main
technological and construction restrictions had been overcome after the First
World War. The importance of the TES, however, should not be restricted
exclusively to the peripheral areas or those that were economically less
developed. In Spain, deficient government regulation (Pueyo 2006, pp. 63-111;
Cayo´n 2009) and collusive agreements between firms allowed the large com-
panies to renounce their natural territorial expansion because they preferred to
externalise the high costs of distribution–commercialisation to TES companies.
Within the small- and medium-sized electricity companies, the case study
of Fensa provides a good number of suggestive contributions to consider
from three different viewpoints: (a) the business strategy, observed through
the decisions taken by its directors; (b) the industrial organisation, seen
through its behaviour in a situation of transition to the establishment of the
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first oligopolistic integrated system, previous to the current structure of the
market; and (c) the level of regional development.
(a) The birth of Fensa shows how in provinces with limited industrial
development (e.g. Navarra), it is possible to recognise outstanding business
initiatives. This was because it was capable of constructing a lucrative and
relatively novel business starting from an idea that had previously failed
(Hidroele´ctrica de Alloz). In fact, by way of applying the latest technology avail-
able on the construction of dams (dome type), it was able to make use of the
hitherto unused water resources available (the River Salado). In contrast to the
Spanish electricity companies of the time (which managed to enter the business
due to the unrivalled strength provided by a solid financial support base and
enormous quantities of energy, e.g. Ibe´rica, Hidrola or Saltos), Fensa entered the
business with the backing of the regional middle class and with differentiation of
its product: the kilowatts that it sold during periods of low water levels.
(b) From the industrial organisation viewpoint, Fensa had the advantage
of operating in a very dynamic industrial market (Guipu´zcoa), which was
still barely controlled by Ibe´rica: the large Basque company that was capable
of imposing, when its production surpluses permitted, its monopolistic
power. This situation occurred with the opening of the second exploitation
that Ibe´rica constructed in the Pyrenees (42,000 kW) in 1932 (Antolı´n 1989,
2006; Garrue´s 1994). However, the dramatic effect of the appearance of the
largest Spanish producer without its own market (Saltos del Duero), due to its
exploitation of the Ricobayo waterfall (88,000 kW), changed the Spanish
electricity panorama. In fact, the efforts of Fensa to reach an agreement with
Ibe´rica that would allow it to increase its production and avoid damaging
competition (the 1935 contract) were unsuccessful. This was because Fensa,
like many other companies from the TES, became a pawn in the game of
alliances designed by the large companies. The agreements signed between
the Hydro Group and Saltos (1934 and 1942/1943) to share out the Spanish
market, with the exception of Catalonia, Galicia and Andalusia, were a good
example. In the hidden confrontation between Duero and Ibe´rica to acquire
the largest share of so-called «shared markets», Fensa became a key element
for control of these markets. This was because it was the only strategically
important and independent company in the Guipu´zcoa and Navarra mar-
kets. For this reason Duero did not accept Ibe´rica’s contract with Fensa, and
the latter company, captive to its productive limitations during the period of
restrictions, became its subsidiary.
In reality, by this stage in the development of the Spanish electricity
system, the survival of the TES had become more and more difficult. The
market power exercised by the large companies (based on their productive
and financial superiority) was way beyond any possible strengths of any of
the traditional companies that, like Fensa, had stood out for their productive
specialisation, competitive pricing policy and reasonable profitability.
With the appearance of Iberduero (from the merger between Duero and
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Ibe´rica), Fensa’s role, as its distribution company, was to organise and
modernise the Navarra market. This task lasted until well into the 1980s.
(c) As far as regional development is concerned, Fensa contributed in
a decisive way. First, it alleviated the electricity shortages and intensified
electrification in one of the most industrially dynamic provinces of Spain
(Guipu´zcoa) during the 1930s and 1940s. Second, Fensa contributed as a
distributor for the largest hydroelectric company in the country by integrating
the old TES in Navarra into Iberduero’s electricity system. This meant that the
electricity supply problems would not be a hindrance to the important economic
takeoff of Navarra’s industry in the second half of the 20th century.
Despite what has been said, and in contrast to other countries49, in Spain
the development of the medium-sized and small companies remained an
unresolved problem. This is the case because without government regula-
tion, which would defend their status, they were left defenceless against
the expansionist logic of the large companies. In fact, at the beginning of
the 1980s when they could have benefited from the new structuring of the
electricity business (Garrue´s 2010) (according to free market principles and
the setting up of the state transmission company, REE; Garrue´s and Lo´pez
2009), it was already too late. Most of the companies had disappeared, or in
the best of cases were no more than oddities of industrial archaeology. For
this reason TES have not received the attention they merit in economic
history. Without doubt, this case study and comparative analysis will help to
display the complexity of the subject and will provoke future debate.
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APPENDIX 1
CLIENTS, PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, FINANCIAL RATIOS AND UNIT COSTS OF FENSA (1930–1980)
Clients Production Consumption Economic financial ratios Real unit cost
Year Fensa Ibe´rica
Own Acquired Distributed Total Industrial Domestic ROE ROA Debt ROE ROA Arteta Irati Ibe´rica Fensa
No. from 1949
(thousands) GWh GWh % % ppu %
Cents/kWh @ 1913 value
3 year average
1930 (2) 2.8 2.8 2.4 94 6 3.6 1.5 0.6 10.7 4.8 2.2 1.4 2.1
1931 (13) 4.6 0.2 4.8 4.1 91 9 4.4 2.2 0.6 12.8 4.8 2.3 1.4 1.9 1.8
1932 (15) 5.2 1.4 6.6 5.6 76 24 4.9 3.2 0.5 10.4 4.8 2.4 1.5 1.9 2.1
1933 (26) 7.7 1.8 9.5 8.1 84 16 5.3 3.3 0.5 6.7 3.9 2.9 1.5 2.2 2.5
1934 (29) 11.4 2.3 13.7 11.6 94 6 6.3 3.5 0.7 8.9 5.1 3.3 1.5 2.5 2.7
1935 (50) 11.9 2.9 14.8 12.5 98 2 6.5 3.3 0.9 8.2 4.5 3.4 1.3 3.2 3.2
1936 (52) 7.3 2.6 9.8 8.3 69 31 1.6 0.8 0.9 2.5 1.4 3.1 1.2 4.0 3.2
1937 (52) 7.9 5.4 13.4 11.3 86 14 4.6 2.0 1.3 0.9 0.5 2.9 1.1 4.2 3.1
1938 (56) 9.5 5.8 15.3 13.0 96 4 7.1 3.6 0.8 4.9 2.6 2.7 1.0 3.5 2.3
1939 (55) 9.4 6.1 15.5 13.2 94 6 5.8 2.7 0.4 5.8 3.2 2.5 1.0 2.5 1.9
1940 (63) 10.8 6.1 17.0 14.4 92 8 4.8 2.6 0.3 4.1 2.6 2.2 0.8 1.9 1.6
1941 8.8 8.8 17.6 14.9 93 7 4.8 3.4 0.3 5.6 3.0 2.0 0.8 1.8 1.5
1942 8.2 10.1 18.3 15.5 93 7 2.3 1.6 0.2 4.8 2.5 0.9 1.6 1.7
1943 (68) 5.8 13.3 19.0 16.1 93 7 0.1 0.1 0.3 4.9 3.2 1.1 1.5 1.6
1944 (64) 17.7 13.2 30.9 26.2 97 3 4.4 3.4 0.3 1.1 1.3 1.4
1945 30.5 13.8 44.2 37.5 96 4 6.5 5.3 0.2 1.0 1.1 1.1
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1946 (75) 49.5 14.1 63.6 53.9 94 6 5.9 4.5 0.2 1.0 0.9 1.0
1947 6.1 4.7 0.2 0.9 0.9
1948 8.0 4.2 0.8 0.9 1.1
1949 55 24 31 55.6 31.9 55 45 7.3 3.4 1.0 0.9 1.3 2.3
1950 59 28 41 69.0 43.5 65 35 10.0 4.0 1.3 0.9 1.4 2.2
1951 62 21 53 73.6 50.2 65 35 9.7 3.0 2.0 0.9 1.4 2.3
1952 63 30 48 78.4 57.1 66 34 15.7 4.5 2.0 0.9 1.4 2.7
1953 65 44 40 83.6 64.1 69 31 6.6 2.8 0.7 1.2 1.7 3.2
1954 67 38 47 84.9 65.1 69 31 8.3 4.7 0.6 1.6 1.8 3.8
1955 69 28 58 86.3 67.6 68 32 10.4 6.0 0.5 2.3 1.8 3.9
1956 70 42 50 92.1 73.4 66 34 13.4 7.8 0.5 2.4 2.0 4.0
1957 72 30 74 103.2 84.3 68 32 15.3 8.9 0.4 2.6 2.1 3.9
1958 73 40 77 117.5 99.2 70 30 21.2 11.2 0.5 2.4 2.2 3.8
1959 75 46 81 126.9 106.0 70 30 19.4 11.2 0.5 2.5 2.0 3.7
1960 79 47 89 136.6 115.1 69 31 18.7 7.6 1.1 1.9 3.6
1961 77 48 103 150.9 130.2 72 28 10.0 6.9 0.2 1.9 3.6
1962 97 56 178 206.7 181.0 71 29 13.7 8.8 0.3 1.6 3.5
1963 101 57 237 255.7 229.7 74 26 11.3 6.9 0.4 1.6 3.4
1964 104 42 283 294.4 262.6 75 25 5.1 3.7 0.3 1.7 3.3
1965 110 61 319 340.7 305.0 75 25 1.2 1.0 0.2 1.8 3.1
1966 116 75 374 407.7 371.5 76 24 1.4 1.1 0.2 1.8 3.0
1967 121 57 466 488.0 448.0 76 24 0.7 0.6 0.2
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Clients Production Consumption Economic financial ratios Real unit cost
Year Fensa Ibe´rica
Own Acquired Distributed Total Industrial Domestic ROE ROA Debt ROE ROA Arteta Irati Ibe´rica Fensa
No. from 1949
(thousands) GWh GWh % % ppu %
Cents/kWh @ 1913 value
3 year average
1968 132 65 527 551.7 510.3 74 25 0.5 0.4 0.2
1969 139 69 639 670.2 623.1 74 26 0.0 0.0 0.3
1970 147 64 723 753.1 709.0 73 27 0.0 0.0 0.4
1971 193 63 819 843.9 786.3 72 28 0.0 0.0 0.6
1972 208 85 924 970.2 889.3 73 27 1.3 0.8 0.5
1973 210 67 1,049 1,081.9 1,014.4 72 28 2.0 1.1 0.5
1974 211 69 1,135 1,166.6 1,115.8 71 30 1.4 0.9 0.6
1975 213 75 1,180 1,222.6 1,138.2 68 32 0.0 0.0 0.5
1976 214 59 1,343 1,356.1 1,285.0 67 33 0.0 0.0 0.6
1977 216 68 1,450 1,463.7 1,387.8 67 33 0.0 0.0 0.8
1978 228 70 1,544 1,570.0 1,484.9 66 34 0.0 0.0 0.4
1979 244 72 1,676 1,698.5 1,623.0 64 36 0.1 0.1 0.3
1980 243 65 1,761 1,775.0 1,717.1 63 37 0.1 0.1 0.3
ROA: return on assets; ROE: return on equity; ROS: return on sales.
Source: Own compilation from consulting monthly entries in the General Ledgers of Fensa (1927-1946), Annual Reports of Fensa (1930-1946); Annual Reports of Arteta
(1930-1941), Annual Reports of Irati (1930-1959) and Annual Reports of Hidroele´ctrica Ibe´rica/Iberduero (1930-1966).
Key: Real unit cost: total cost/kWh sold; ROA: income before tax/total assets; ROE: income before tax/shareholders’ equity; ROS: income before tax/sales; Debt ratio:
external financing/ self-financing (share capital1 reserves). *Industrial clients in parenthesis.
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APPENDIX 2
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DATA (1930-1980)
Fensa Ibe´rica Hidrola Irati Arteta
Year
Equity
capital Bonds Profits Sales
Distribution of
dividends
Board of directors Shareholders
103 thousand pesetas % profits Dividend yield Dividends Dividends Dividends Dividends
1930 3,998 1,939 0,143 0,211 9 10 10 9.5
1931 4,977 1,979 0,217 0,347 10 5 9 10 11 10
1932 6,011 1,979 0,296 0,519 9 5 9 9 10 10
1933 6,025 1,979 0,317 0,744 10 4 8.5 9 8.8 10
1934 6,040 4,134 0,379 1,066 10 5 8.5 9 9.0 10
1935 6,059 4,251 0,392 1,082 9 5 8 9 9.5 10
1936 6,078 4,206 0,099 0,785 4.5 4.8 10
1937 6,078 5,158 0,280 1,020 9 3 5.5 4.8 10
1938 6,091 4,086 0,435 1,145 10 5 8 5 6.0 10
1939 7,832 4,052 0,454 1,207 13 5 6 5 8.9 12
1940 14,097 3,864 0,678 1,258 12 7 7 8 11.4 5
1941 20,012 3,591 0,958 1,540 13 5 7 8 11.8 10
1942 25,207 3,475 0,580 1,587 12 2 6 8 7.0 10
1943 25,244 3,272 0,024 1,480 6 8 8.7 5
1944 30,244 3,203 1,344 2,352 10 4 6 8 8.7 10
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Fensa Ibe´rica Hidrola Irati Arteta
Year
Equity
capital Bonds Profits Sales
Distribution of
dividends
Board of directors Shareholders
103 thousand pesetas % profits Dividend yield Dividends Dividends Dividends Dividends
1945 30,298 2,863 1,973 3,078 10 4 5 7 8.7 10
1946 30,448 1,900 1,810 4,309 5 4 6 8 8.0 10
1947 30,598 1,732 1,861 4,539 5 4 6.5 9 8.3 10
1948 30,598 18,568 2,459 10,704 4 4 7 10 8.9 10
1949 30,598 18,892 2,244 12,383 5 4 7 10 8.8 10
1950 30,598 23,390 3,055 17,622 5 4 8.5 10 8.5 10
1951 30,598 19,504 2,964 19,663 5 4 9.5 10 8.4 10
1952 30,598 19,217 4,811 22,518 4 4 10 10 9.4 9
1953 45,888 18,645 3,048 33,008 7 11 10 9.4 10
1954 58,823 18,337 4,897 36,931 7 11 10 8.4 10
1955 60,541 17,677 6,301 43,688 7 11 12 8.4 10
1956 62,767 16,974 8,423 48,656 8 12 12 9.5
1957 66,602 16,245 10,163 62,412 8 12 12 9.5
1958 72,139 15,500 15,259 79,345 8 12 12 8.7
1959 85,740 14,908 16,629 83,874 8 12 12 9.6
1960 97,569 13,849 18,265 90,476 8 12 12 9.2
1961 193,699 13,359 19,291 98,628 8 12 12
1962 208,148 12,853 28,461 139,885 8 12 12
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1963 225,409 12,321 25,510 172,843 6 12 12
1964 272,990 11,767 14,046 195,332 4 12 12
1965 642,327 11,184 7,629 220,156 4 12 12
1966 643,532 10,567 8,758 262,999 4 12 12
1967 824,845 9,913 5,656 314,927
1968 807,576 9,238 4,025 364,215
1969 811,601 8,564 0 435,635
1970 811,313 7,820 0 498,752
1971 811,229 7,034 0 610,252
1972 971,229 166,221 13,041 687,693
1973 984,200 165,368 19,194 1,208,865
1974 1,186,933 164,463 17,060 1,865,354
1975 2,003,127 155,816 0 2,352,654
1976 2,004,503 146,883 0 3,079,450
1977 2,004,503 137,118 0 3,736,621
1978 3,022,523 126,298 0 4,349,019
1979 5,355,706 116,429 7,519 5,182,181
1980 6,998,798 105,165 7,661 7,297,497
Source: see Appendix 1 and Antolı´n (2006), Aubanell (2006), Go´mez Mendoza (2006) and Sudria` (2006) in relation to the dividends of Ibe´rica and
Hidrola.
Key: Dividend yield: annual dividends per share/price per share; Equity capital: share capital and reserves.
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